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Abstract 
In this paper, I construct an inflation model in an economy where the government and 
households behave under a procedure based on the maximum degree of comfortability 
(MDC) to reach steady state. MDC indicates the state at which the combination of 
revenues and assets is felt most comfortable. I show that, if MDCs of the government and 
households are not consistent, inflation accelerates (or decelerates) because the 
government behaves to match the rate of increase of its real obligations with its MDC, 
but households and firms behave to match the real interest rate with household’s MDC. 
This inconsistency or contradiction must be resolved by acceleration (or deceleration) of 
inflation. To control inflation, therefore, a truly independent central bank is needed 
because MDC is a type of preference. The central bank can control the government’s 
MDC by forcing the government to increase its real obligations and thereby control 
inflation. 
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1  INTRODUCTION 
 
There are two competing inflation models: those based on the New Keynesian Phillips 
curve (NKPC) and those based on the fiscal theory of the price level (FTPL). However, 
neither of them seems to be sufficiently compelling because both possess important 
problems. First, the pure NKPC has a serious problem in that it is not consistent with the 
observed persistence of inflation (e.g., Fuhrer and Moore, 1995; Galí and Gertler, 1999; 
Mankiw, 2001). Since Galí and Gertler (1999), a modified version of NKPC (i.e., the 
hybrid NKPC) that includes lagged inflation has been intensely studied. The hybrid 
NKPC captures the persistent nature of inflation well, but the question remains of why 
rational agents behave in a backward-looking manner, even if only partially. Galí, Gertler, 
and López-Salido (2005) argued that a more coherent rationale for the role of lagged 
inflation needs to be addressed in the hybrid NKPC. Furthermore, Fuhrer (2006) 
concluded that inflation in the hybrid NKPC inherits relatively little persistence from its 
driving process. 
 Proponents of FTPL argue that a problem with conventional NKPC inflation 
theory is that it largely neglects the importance of the government’s borrowing behavior 
in inflation dynamics (e.g., Leeper 1991; Sims 1994, 1998, 2001; Woodford 1995, 2001; 
Cochrane 1998a, 1998b, 2005). They say that, if a government borrows money without 
limits, inflation will eventually explode (e.g., Sargent and Wallace 1981). The FTPL 
implies that, if a government’s borrowing behavior is modeled well, the mechanism of 
severely deviated inflation paths can be explained without assuming ad hoc frictions or 
irrationality. Most FTPL models have not, however, explicitly modeled the behavior of 
government in detail. Hence, some critics contend that the theory is fallacious (e.g., 
Kocherlakota and Phelan 1999; McCallum 2001, 2003; Buiter 2002, 2004; Niepelt 2004). 
 Harashima (2004, 2005, 2006, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c, 2008, 2013a, 2013b, 2016a, 
2018c) has presented an alternative inflation model that can explain the persistent nature 
of inflation without an ad hoc assumption that households behave in a backward-looking 
manner and that explicitly incorporates the government’s borrowing behavior. That is, 
this model can solve the main problems of the inflation models based on NKPC and FTPL. 
In this alternative model, a trend in inflation is naturally generated as a result of 
heterogeneity in the rate of time preference (RTP) between households and the 
government.  
 Similar to most other recent economic models, Harashima’s alternative inflation 
model is constructed in the framework of the rational expectations hypothesis. However, 
the rational expectations hypothesis has been criticized for imposing substantial demands 
on economic agents. To generate rational expectations, households have to do something 
equivalent to computing complex, large-scale, non-linear, dynamic macro-econometric 
 2 
models, but can a household routinely do such a thing in its daily life? Evans and 
Honkapohja (2001) have argued that this problem can be solved by introducing a learning 
mechanism (see also, e.g., Marcet and Sargent, 1989; Ellison and Pearlman, 2011), but 
this solution is not necessarily regarded as being sufficiently successful because arbitrary 
learning rules have to be assumed. 
 Harashima (2018a, 2019) has presented an alternative procedure for households 
to reach steady state as a substitute for the conventionally assumed procedure, under 
which rational expectations are generated with the RTP-based procedure. Under the 
alternative procedure, the capital-wage ratio (CWR) at the “maximum degree of 
comfortability” (MDC) plays the crucial role (hereafter, the MDC-based procedure). The 
MDC-based procedure is very simple. A household has only to act on its feelings about 
whether the combination of its labor income and capital (wealth) is comfortable or not; 
that is, households behave targeting only their own CWR at their own MDC. The steady 
state reached under the MDC-based procedure can be interpreted to be equivalent to the 
one reached under the RTP-based procedure (i.e., the one that is rationally expected). 
Because the MDC-based procedure is far easier for households to use than the RTP-based 
procedure and leads households to the same steady state, it is much more likely that 
households actually use the MDC-based procedure rather than the RTP-based procedure.  
 Here, I modify Harashima’s RTP-based inflation model so that households and 
the government behave based on this MDC-based procedure, rather than the originally 
proposed RTP procedure. The modified inflation model indicates that even under the 
MDC-based procedure, trend inflation is still naturally generated as a result of 
heterogeneity in preferences, in this case, inconsistency between MDCs of households 
and the government. The element of expectations is therefore irrelevant to the law of 
motion for inflation in this modified model, although households and the government still 
behave fully in forward-looking manners.  
 
2  MDC-BASED PROCEDURE 
 
In this section, the MDC-based procedure is explained briefly following Harashima 
(2018a, 2019). 
 
2.1  “Comfortability” of CWR 
Let kt and wt be per capita capital and wage (labor income), respectively, in period t. 
Under the MDC-based procedure, a household should first subjectively evaluate the value 
of 
?̆?𝑡
?̆?𝑡
 where ?̆?𝑡 and ?̆?𝑡 are household kt and wt, respectively. Let Γ be the subjective 
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valuation of 
?̆?𝑡
?̆?𝑡
 by a household and Γi be the value of 
?̆?𝑡
?̆?𝑡
 of household i (i = 1, 2, 3, … , 
M). Each household assesses whether it feels comfortable with its current Γ (i.e., its 
combination of income and capital expressed by CWR). “Comfortable” in this context 
means “at ease,” “not anxious,” and other similar feelings.  
 Let the “degree of comfortability” (DOC) represent how comfortable a 
household feels with its Γ. The higher the value of DOC, the more a household feels 
comfortable with its Γ. For each household, there will be a most comfortable CWR value 
because the household will feel less comfortable if CWR is either too high or too low. 
That is, for each household, a maximum DOC exists. Let ?̃? be a household’s state at 
which its DOC is the maximum (MDC). MDC therefore indicates the state at which the 
combination of revenues and assets is felt most comfortable. Let 𝛤(?̃?) be a household’s 
Γ when it is at ?̃?. 𝛤(?̃?) indicates the Γ that gives a household its MDC, and 𝛤(?̃?𝑖) is 
household i’s Γi when it is at ?̃?𝑖.  
 
2.2  Homogeneous population 
I first examine the behavior of households in a homogeneous population (i.e., all 
households are assumed to be identical).  
 
2.2.1  Rules  
Household i should act according to the following rules:  
 
Rule 1-1: If household i feels that the current Γi is equal to 𝛤(?̃?𝑖), it maintains the same 
level of consumption for any i.  
Rule 1-2: If household i feels that the current Γi is not equal to 𝛤(?̃?𝑖), it adjusts its level 
of consumption until it feels that Γi is equal to 𝛤(?̃?𝑖) for any i. 
 
2.2.2  Steady state  
Households can reach a steady state even if they behave only according to Rules 1-1 and 
1-2. Let St be the state of the entire economy in period t and 𝛤(𝑆𝑡) be the value of 
𝑤𝑡
𝑘𝑡
 
of the entire economy at St (i.e., the economy’s average CWR). In addition, let ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶 be 
the steady state at which MDC is achieved and kept constant by all households, and 
𝛤(?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶) be 𝛤(𝑆𝑡) for 𝑆𝑡 = ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶. Let also ?̃?𝑅𝑇𝑃 be the steady state under the RTP-
based procedure; that is, it is the steady state in a Ramsey-type growth model in which 
households behave based on rational expectations generated by discounting utilities by θ, 
where θ (> 0) is the RTP of a household. In addition, let 𝛤(?̃?𝑅𝑇𝑃) be 𝛤(𝑆𝑡) for 𝑆𝑡 =
?̃?𝑅𝑇𝑃.  
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Proposition 1: If households behave according to Rules 1-1 and 1-2, and if the value of 
θ that is calculated from the values of variables at ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶 is used as the value of θ under 
the RTP-based procedure in an economy where θ is identical for all households, then 
𝛤(?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶) = 𝛤(?̃?𝑅𝑇𝑃).     
Proof: See Harashima (2018a, 2019).  
 
Proposition 1 indicates that we can interpret ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶 to be equivalent to ?̃?𝑅𝑇𝑃. This means 
that both the MDC-based and RTP-based procedures can function equivalently and that 
CWR at MDC can be substituted for RTP as a guide for household behavior.  
 
2.3  Heterogeneous population 
In actuality, however, households are not identical—they are heterogeneous—and if 
heterogeneous households behave unilaterally, there is no guarantee that a steady state 
other than corner solutions exists (Becker, 1980; Harashima, 2010, 2012, 2017). However, 
Harashima (2010, 2012, 2017) has shown that a sustainable heterogeneity (SH) at which 
all optimality conditions of all heterogeneous households are simultaneously satisfied 
exists under the RTP-based procedure. In addition, Harashima (2018a, 2019) has shown 
that SH also exists under the MDC-based procedure, although Rules 1-1 and 1-2 have to 
be revised, and a rule for the government should be added in a heterogeneous population.     
 Suppose that households are identical except for their MDCs (i.e., their values 
of 𝛤(?̃?)). Let ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻 be the steady state at which MDC is achieved and kept constant 
by any household (i.e., SH in a heterogeneous population under the MDC-based 
procedure), and let 𝛤(?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻) be 𝛤(𝑆𝑡) for 𝑆𝑡 = ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻 . In addition, let ΓR be a 
household’s numerically adjusted value of Γ for SH based on its estimated value of 
𝛤(?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻) and several other related values. Specifically, let ΓR,i be ΓR of household i, T 
be the net transfer that a household receives from the government with regard to SH, and 
Ti be the net transfer that household i receives (i = 1,2,3, … , M). 
 
2.3.1  Revised and additional rules 
Household i should act according to the following rules in a heterogeneous population:  
 
Rule 2-1: If household i feels that the current ΓR,i is equal to 𝛤(?̃?𝑖), it maintains the same 
level of consumption as before for any i. 
Rule 2-2: If household i feels that the current ΓR,i is not equal to 𝛤(?̃?𝑖), it adjusts its level 
of consumption or revises its estimated value of 𝛤(?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻) so that it perceives that ΓR,i 
is equal to 𝛤(?̃?𝑖) for any i.  
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At the same time, the government should act according to the following rule:  
 
Rule 3: The government adjusts Ti for some i if necessary so as to make the number of 
votes cast in elections in response to increases in the level of economic inequality 
equivalent to the number cast in response to decreases. 
 
2.3.2  Steady state  
Even if households and the government behave according to Rules 2-1, 2-2, and 3, there 
is no guarantee that the economy can reach ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻.  However, thanks to the 
government’s intervention, SH can be approximately achieved. Let ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻,𝑎𝑝 be the 
state at which ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻  is approximately achieved, and 𝛤(?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻,𝑎𝑝)  be 𝛤(𝑆𝑡)  at 
?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻,𝑎𝑝 on average. Here, let ?̃?𝑅𝑇𝑃,𝑆𝐻 be the steady state that satisfies SH under the 
RTP-based procedure, that is, in a Ramsey-type growth model in which households that 
are identical except for their θs behave generating rational expectations by discounting 
utilities by their θs. Furthermore, let 𝛤(?̃?𝑅𝑇𝑃,𝑆𝐻) be 𝛤(𝑆𝑡) for 𝑆𝑡 = ?̃?𝑅𝑇𝑃,𝑆𝐻. 
 
Proposition 2: If households are identical except for their values of 𝛤(?̃?) and behave 
unilaterally according to Rules 2-1 and 2-2, if the government behaves according to Rule 
3, and if the value of θi that is calculated back from the values of variables at ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻,𝑎𝑝 
is used as the value of θi for any i under the RTP-based procedure in an economy where 
households are identical except for their θs, then 𝛤(?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻,𝑎𝑝) = 𝛤(?̃?𝑅𝑇𝑃,𝑆𝐻).  
Proof: See Harashima (2018a, 2019).  
 
Proposition 2 indicates that we can interpret ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻,𝑎𝑝 as being equivalent to ?̃?𝑅𝑇𝑃,𝑆𝐻. 
No matter what values of T, ΓR, and 𝛤(?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻) are estimated by households, any 
?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻,𝑎𝑝 can be interpreted as the objectively correct and true steady state. In addition, 
a government need not necessarily provide the objectively correct Ti for ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻,𝑎𝑝 even 
though the ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶,𝑆𝐻,𝑎𝑝 is interpreted as objectively correct and true. 
 
3  GOVERNMENT AND HOUSEHOLD MDC  
 
Suppose for simplicity that technologies are exogenously given and constant (i.e., there 
is no technological progress). 
 
3.1  The nature of the government’s MDC  
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3.1.1  MDC  
The value of  
 
−
g
𝑡
− 𝑥𝑡 − 𝑠𝑡
𝑏𝑡
 
 
is constant at steady state such that ġ
𝑡
= 0, ẋ𝑡 = 0, ṡ𝑡 = 0, and ?̇?𝑡 = 0, where bt is the 
nominal obligation of the government to pay for its accumulated bonds, gt is the nominal 
government expenditure, xt is the nominal tax revenue, and st is the nominal amount of 
seigniorage at time t, respectively. All variables are expressed in per capita terms. At this 
steady state, the MDC of government should be satisfied because it is the steady state that 
the government wants and has successfully managed to achieve. Let 
 
𝛤𝐺 = −
g
𝑡
− 𝑥𝑡 − 𝑠𝑡
𝑏𝑡
(
𝛼
1 − 𝛼
)                       (1) 
 
at the government’s MDC where α (0 < α < 1) is a constant in the production function 
that is assumed to be 𝑦𝑡 = 𝐴
𝛼𝑘𝑡
1−𝛼, yt is per capita output at time t, and A is technology. 
Because −
g𝑡−𝑥𝑡−𝑠𝑡
𝑏𝑡
 at the MDC of government (i.e., at steady state) and α are constant, 
𝛤𝐺 is also constant. In addition, 𝛤𝐺 indicates the most comfortable combination of net 
revenues (g
𝑡
− 𝑥𝑡 − 𝑠𝑡 ) and debts (bt) while MDC indicates the state at which the 
combination of revenues and assets is felt most comfortable. Hence, 𝛤𝐺 can be seen as a 
parameter that indicates the preference of government concerning its MDC. 
 Let θG be the RTP of government. Harashima (2006, 2016a) has shown that in a 
Ramsey-type growth model in which a government maximizes its expected utility,  
 
𝜃𝐺 = −
g
𝑡
− 𝑥𝑡 − 𝑠𝑡
𝑏𝑡
                                                 (2) 
 
holds at steady state for a given value of 𝜃𝐺 . By equations (1) and (2), therefore, 
 
𝜃𝐺 = 𝛤𝐺 (
1 − 𝛼
𝛼
)  .                                                  (3) 
 
at steady state. 
 The value of −
g𝑡−𝑥𝑡−𝑠𝑡
𝑏𝑡
 at steady state in equations (1) and (2) indicates the 
rate of increase of the government’s real obligation to pay for its bonds’ return at steady 
state. 
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3.1.2  Rate of increase of the government’s real obligation 
Let Rt be the nominal interest rate for government bonds at time t. Harashima (2007a, 
2007c, 2008, 2013a, 2013b, 2018c) has shown that approximately 
 
𝑅𝑡 = ∫ ∫ 𝜋𝑣𝑑𝑣𝑑𝑠 + 𝑟
𝑠+1
𝑠
𝑡
𝑡−1
 ,                                          (4) 
 
where πt is the inflation rate at time t and r is the real interest rate at steady state in the 
private sector. The private sector means the part of the economy run by households and 
non-governmental firms. 
 Evidently, 𝑅𝑡 − 𝜋𝑡  indicates the rate of increase of the government’s real 
obligation at time t. On the other hand, as shown in Section 3.1.1, the value of 
−
g𝑡−𝑥𝑡−𝑠𝑡
𝑏𝑡
 at steady state also indicates the rate of increase of the government’s real 
obligation. Hence, at steady state 
 
𝑅𝑡 − 𝜋𝑡 = −
g
𝑡
− 𝑥𝑡 − 𝑠𝑡
𝑏𝑡
 .                                                 (5) 
 
Therefore, by equations (1), (2), and (5), 
 
𝑅𝑡 − 𝜋𝑡 = 𝛤𝐺 (
1 − 𝛼
𝛼
)  = 𝜃𝐺                                            (6) 
 
 
at steady state such that ġ
𝑡
= 0, ẋ𝑡 = 0, ṡ𝑡 = 0, and ?̇?𝑡 = 0, which is also at MDC of 
government. Hence, the increases in the government’s real obligation 
 
 (𝑅𝑡 − 𝜋𝑡)𝑏𝑡 = [𝛤𝐺 (
1 − 𝛼
𝛼
) + 𝜋𝑡] 𝑏𝑡 (= 𝜃𝐺𝑏𝑡) 
 
is equal to the real budget surplus −(g
𝑡
− 𝑥𝑡 − 𝑠𝑡) at steady state. 
 Note that the rate of increase of the government’s real obligation (𝑅𝑡 − 𝜋𝑡) is not 
necessarily equal to the real interest rate in the private sector (r), as indicated in equation 
(4). 
 
3.2  The nature of household MDC 
3.2.1  MDC  
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Suppose for simplicity that all households are identical (i.e., the homogeneous population 
model shown in Section 2.2 is used) because the focus of this paper is on the law of 
motion for inflation, not on household heterogeneity, and the law of motion for inflation 
basically does not change in the case of heterogeneous population. Note that because ?̃? 
indicates the state of the private sector, the capital owned by government is not included 
in kt in 𝛤(?̃?) and 𝛤(?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶).  
 Let ΓP be the household Γ (i.e., the value of 
𝑤𝑡
𝑘𝑡
 at the MDC of each identical 
household), and therefore  
 
 ΓP = 𝛤(?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶) . 
 
In addition, let θP be the RTP of each identical household under the RTP-based procedure. 
The numerical value of θP is unknown to the household, but it can be estimated by 
calculating it back from the value of ΓP under the MDC-based procedure, as will be shown 
below. Note, nevertheless, that we cannot know that this estimated numerical value of θP 
is identical to its objectively correct, true, and intrinsic value.  
 The numerical value of θP can be estimated based on the value of ΓP as follows. 
First, suppose a Ramsey-type growth model such that each identical household 
maximizes its expected utility  
 
𝐸 ∫ exp(−𝜃𝑃𝑡)𝑢(𝑐𝑡)𝑑𝑡
∞
0
 
 
subject to  
 
 
𝑑𝑘𝑡
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑓(𝐴, 𝑘𝑡) − 𝑐𝑡 , 
where ct is the per capita consumption at time t, 𝑢(∙) is the utility function, and 𝑓(𝐴, 𝑘𝑡) 
is the production function. The production function is assumed to be the same as that 
assumed in Section 3.1.1 (i.e., 𝑦𝑡 = 𝐴
𝛼𝑘𝑡
1−𝛼). In this Ramsey-type growth model, as a 
result of the utility maximization behavior of households,   
 
𝜃𝑃 (
𝛼
1 − 𝛼
) =
𝑤𝑡
𝑘𝑡
                                                        (7) 
 
at steady state such that ?̇?𝑡 = 0 and ?̇?𝑡 = 0, where wt is the per capita labor income 
(wage) that indicates the contribution of labor to output and  
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𝑦𝑡 = 𝑤𝑡 +
𝜕𝑦𝑡
𝜕𝑘𝑡
𝑘𝑡 .                                                  (8) 
 
 On the other hand, if household MDC is achieved under the MDC-based 
procedure (i.e., at ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶),  
 
𝑤𝑡
𝑘𝑡
= 𝛤(?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶) = 𝛤𝑃                                                  (9) 
 
because ?̇?𝑡 = 0 and ?̇?𝑡 = 0 at ?̃?𝑀𝐷𝐶. Hence, we can obtain the numerical value of θP 
by calculating it back from the value of ΓP by substituting equation (9) into equation (7). 
 
3.2.2  The real interest rate  
The real interest rate (r) is determined by 
 
𝑟 =
𝜕𝑦𝑡
𝜕𝑘𝑡
                                                         (10) 
 
in the private sector. On the other hand, by the production function (𝑦𝑡 = 𝐴
𝛼𝑘𝑡
1−𝛼),  
 
𝜕𝑦𝑡
𝜕𝑘𝑡
= (1 − 𝛼)𝐴𝛼𝑘𝑡
−𝛼 = (1 − 𝛼)
𝐴𝛼𝑘𝑡
1−𝛼
𝑘𝑡
= (1 − 𝛼)
𝑦𝑡
𝑘𝑡
 ,                 (11) 
 
and by equations (8) and (11), 
 
𝑦𝑡
𝑘𝑡
= 𝛼−1
𝑤𝑡
𝑘𝑡
 .                                                    (12) 
 
Hence, by equations (7), (9), (10), (11), and (12),  
 
𝑟 = 𝛤𝑃 (
1 − 𝛼
𝛼
)  = 𝜃𝑃                                              (13) 
 
at steady state such that ?̇?𝑡 = 0 and ?̇?𝑡 = 0. 
 
4  LAW OF MOTION FOR INFLATION 
 
It is assumed that ΓG and ΓP are heterogeneous. In addition, ΓP < ΓG (i.e., 𝜃𝑃 < 𝜃𝐺  by 
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equations [3] and [13]) because this inequality seems to be naturally satisfied and to have 
held historically in most economies (see Harashima, 2004, 2007a, 2007c, 2008, 2013a, 
2013b, 2018c).  
 
4.1  Government 
Suppose that the government initially guesses that the rate of increase of its real obligation 
( 𝑅𝑡 − 𝜋𝑡 ) is currently lower than 𝛤𝐺 (
1−𝛼
𝛼
) , that is, 𝑅𝑡 − 𝜋𝑡 < 𝛤𝐺 (
1−𝛼
𝛼
) . Because 
equation (6) has to hold at the MDC of government, the current state 𝑅𝑡 − 𝜋𝑡 < 𝛤𝐺 (
1−𝛼
𝛼
) 
does not correspond to the MDC of government. Therefore, the government will take 
actions to increase 𝑅𝑡 − 𝜋𝑡 up to the point at which equation (6) is satisfied.  
 To increase 𝑅𝑡 − 𝜋𝑡 , the government will absorb additional money (savings) 
from the private sector, particularly by selling more government bonds and increasing its 
borrowings (bt). Because additional government bonds are supplied in the private sector, 
their price decreases, and thereby their nominal interest rate (Rt) increases. If the inflation 
rate (πt) is unchanged, the rate of increase of the government’s real obligation (𝑅𝑡 − 𝜋𝑡) 
also increases. Nevertheless, equation (1) indicates that current additional increases in bt 
require additional increases in xt (tax revenue) and/or decreases in gt (expenditures) at 
steady state (i.e., in the future). Even so, however, the government will increase bt up to 
the point at which equation (6) is satisfied to be able to reach its MDC.  
 This behavior (i.e., current additional increases in bt despite future additional 
increases in xt and/or decreases in gt) means that the government cares relatively more 
about the present and less about the future. That is, it has a higher time preference rate 
(θG) than the discount rate that the initial value of 𝑅𝑡 − 𝜋𝑡 indicates. The state where the 
government’s satisfaction with the balance between current borrowing subject to future 
payment is maximized is its MDC. If a government borrows substantially large amounts 
of money from the private sector at present despite high future costs, the government’s 
𝛤𝐺 (or θG) is very high. This value may become particularly high in the case where a 
regime is in danger, for example, after a defeat in war or a revolution. Even in this type 
of extreme case, however, a government can still behave with appropriate consideration 
of its future, and its 𝛤𝐺 (or θG) will still stay within the usual range.  
 
4.2  Households and firms 
4.2.1  Households 
If the government successfully manipulates and increases 𝑅𝑡 − 𝜋𝑡  up to the point at 
which equation (6) is satisfied, 𝑅𝑡 − 𝜋𝑡 becomes larger than the real interest rate in the 
private sector (r) because ΓP < ΓG. That is, by equations (6) and (13), 
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𝑟 = 𝛤𝑃 (
1 − 𝛼
𝛼
) < 𝛤𝐺 (
1 − 𝛼
𝛼
) = 𝑅𝑡 − 𝜋𝑡                                (14) 
 
for ΓP < ΓG. Inequality (14) means that the real capital incomes of households that own 
government bonds will unexpectedly increase from the levels estimated before the 
government began to manipulate 𝑅𝑡 − 𝜋𝑡  because the households initially estimated 
their real capital incomes based on r, not 𝑅𝑡 − 𝜋𝑡 (i.e., 𝛤𝐺 (
1−𝛼
𝛼
)).  
 Faced with the unexpectedly larger capital incomes, households will feel richer. 
Consequently, they may feel that they can buy more higher-priced goods and services 
than before. At the least, households’ psychological resistance to purchasing higher-
priced goods and services will be weakened to some extent.  
 On the other hand, the unexpectedly larger capital incomes mean that the value 
of Γ also is perceived as higher than previously estimated; that is, the household feels that 
Γ > ΓP, not Γ = ΓP. If a household does not change its consumption, its capital will 
gradually increase, and thereby the value of Γ will eventually be perceived as lower than 
ΓP (i.e., Γ < ΓP). In any case, the estimated value of Γ will continuously deviate from ΓP. 
Hence, faced with an unexpectedly larger capital income, a household will adjust its 
behaviors so as to return to the state Γ = ΓP. In particular, it will increase its consumption 
to lower the value of Γ to the point at which the household again feels that Γ = ΓP. 
Increasing consumption means a higher probability that households will purchase higher-
priced goods and services, so households’ psychological resistance to purchasing higher-
priced goods and services will be weakened from this channel as well.  
 This weakened psychological barrier to higher prices means that households can 
tolerate a higher general price level than they previously would have in an environment 
where the government forces 𝑅𝑡 − 𝜋𝑡 to be equal to 𝛤𝐺 (
1−𝛼
𝛼
). They do so because, as 
shown above, they can maintain a perceived Γ = ΓP by adjusting their behaviors even if 
the general price level increases. Maintaining that perception (i.e., that Γ = ΓP) is 
equivalent to maintaining a state where 𝑟 = 𝛤𝑃 (
1−𝛼
𝛼
) is satisfied, so households look as 
if they are keeping 𝑟 = 𝛤𝑃 (
1−𝛼
𝛼
) regardless of what the government does. 
 Note that if a household surmises that labor income has become permanently 
higher thanks to technological progress, it will also increase its consumption up to the 
point where Γ = ΓP. In this case, however, prices do not change because there is no 
motivation to force 𝑅𝑡 − 𝜋𝑡 to increase.  
 
4.2.2  Firms 
When 𝑅𝑡 − 𝜋𝑡  increases, the real interest cost of firms will also increase through 
arbitration in financial markets until it becomes equal to the new value of 𝑅𝑡 − 𝜋𝑡. That 
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is, if πt is unchanged, the real interest cost will become larger than the real interest rate 
(r), as inequality (14) indicates. Faced with this higher real interest cost, firms will be 
motivated to raise the prices of their goods and services because otherwise they will suffer 
losses, and in fact, they will actually raise prices. If the demand for these products changes 
little in response to the increases in prices, firms will maintain the higher price levels even 
after that. Furthermore, firms will not stop raising the prices until equation (13) is again 
satisfied. 
 
4.2.3  Combined forces 
When inequality (14) is forced by government actions, households will be willing to allow 
a higher general price level, as Section 4.2.1 indicates; and at the same time, firms will 
more likely raise prices, as Section 4.2.2 indicates. Therefore, the general price level will 
increase as a result of households’ and firms’ combined responses to the increased 𝑅𝑡 −
𝜋𝑡.  
 If a firm raises the price of its intermediate product, it can increase revenues and 
profits, but other firms that purchase this intermediate product will be tempted to raise 
the prices of their products and will eventually raise them because they will suffer losses 
if they do not raise their prices. An increase in price from the initial firm will therefore 
produce a chain-reaction of price increases.  
 In addition, if the general price level increases due to increases in product prices 
by firms, the real wage (wt) will decrease and households will be unable to maintain Γ = 
ΓP. Faced with the decrease in wt, workers will be highly motivated to push for higher 
nominal wages to maintain the previous value of wt. 
 As a result, the inflation rate (𝜋𝑡) will increase, but it will not increase beyond 
the level that satisfies 𝑅𝑡 − 𝜋𝑡 = 𝑟. If 𝑅𝑡 − 𝜋𝑡 = 𝑟 is satisfied, households will feel that 
Γ = ΓP and that MDC is satisfied. In addition, if Γ = ΓP is satisfied, 𝑟 = 𝛤𝑃 (
1−𝛼
𝛼
), and 
the motivation for firms to increase the prices of their products will disappear because 
households will no longer tolerate higher prices and the firm would suffer losses by 
attempting to raise prices. Hence, both households and firms will act in such a way as to 
not allow the inflation rate to increase beyond the level at which 𝑅𝑡 − 𝜋𝑡 = 𝑟 is satisfied.  
 
4.3  The law of motion for inflation 
Section 2.2 indicates that the government behaves so as to force equation (6), and at the 
same time, households and firms behave as if they persistently maintain equation (13). 
Therefore, equations (6) and (13) have to be satisfied simultaneously while equation (4) 
always holds. Hence, by equations (4), (6), and (13), 
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 𝛤𝐺 (
1 − 𝛼
𝛼
) + 𝜋𝑡 = ∫ ∫ 𝜋𝑣𝑑𝑣𝑑𝑠 + 𝛤𝑃 (
1 − 𝛼
𝛼
)
𝑠+1
𝑠
 ;
𝑡
𝑡−1
 
 
that is,  
 
∫ ∫ 𝜋𝑣𝑑𝑣𝑑𝑠
𝑠+1
𝑠
𝑡
𝑡−1
= 𝜋𝑡 + (
1 − 𝛼
𝛼
) (𝛤𝐺 − 𝛤𝑃)                            (15) 
 
holds. By equations (3) and (13), equation (15) is equivalent to 
 
∫ ∫ 𝜋𝑣𝑑𝑣𝑑𝑠
𝑠+1
𝑠
𝑡
𝑡−1
= 𝜋𝑡 + 𝜃𝐺 − 𝜃𝑃 .                                  (16) 
 
Equation (16) is exactly the same equation obtained under the RTP-based procedure 
shown in Harashima (2004, 2007c, 2008, 2013b, 2018c). 
 What is important in equation (15) is that the contradiction between equations 
(6) and (13)—that is, the discrepancy between the rate of increase of the government’s 
real obligation and the real interest rate in the private sector generated by heterogeneity 
in the preference (ΓP < ΓG) as indicated in inequality (14)—is resolved through the 
acceleration of inflation. Conversely, inflation accelerates because the values of 𝛤𝐺 and 
𝛤𝑃  (or 𝜃𝐺  and 𝜃𝑃 ) are different. This is the essential mechanism of inflation 
acceleration, and equation (15) indicates the law of motion for inflation, particularly for 
its trend component. Because equation (16) is exactly the same equation as the one 
obtained under the RTP-based procedure, the law of motion for inflation is identical under 
both procedures.  
 A solution of equation (15) for given values of 𝛤𝐺 and 𝛤𝑃 is 
 
𝜋𝑡 = 𝜋0 + 6 (
1 − 𝛼
𝛼
) (𝛤𝐺 − 𝛤𝑃)𝑡
2 .                                   (17) 
 
Equation (17) is equivalent to  
 
𝜋𝑡 = 𝜋0 + 6(𝜃𝐺 − 𝜃𝑃)𝑡
2                                            (18) 
 
for given values of 𝜃𝐺  and 𝜃𝑃. Harashima (2007a, 2007c, 2008, 2013a, 2013b, 2018c) 
has shown that, generally, the paths of inflation that satisfy equation (17) or (18) for 0 ≤ t 
are expressed as 
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𝜋𝑡 = 𝜋0 + 6 (
1 − 𝛼
𝛼
) (𝛤𝐺 − 𝛤𝑃)exp[𝑧𝑡ln(𝑡)] 
 
or 
 
 𝜋𝑡 = 𝜋0 + 6(𝜃𝐺 − 𝜃𝑃)exp[𝑧𝑡ln(𝑡)] , 
 
respectively, where zt is a time-dependent variable. If πt satisfies equation (17) or (18) for 
0 ≤ t and −∞ < 𝜋𝑡 < ∞ for −1 < 𝑡 ≤ 1, then 
 
 lim
𝑡→∞
𝑧𝑡 = 2 . 
 
4.4  The role of expectations 
In conventional NKPC-type inflation models, expectations play an essential role for the 
development of inflation. Expectations can be both forward-looking and backward-
looking, but the former have been viewed as far more likely to be actually generated than 
the latter because economic agents are viewed as rational. However, in these conventional 
inflation models, a key property of inflation—persistence—cannot be fully explained 
only by forward-looking expectations (e.g., Fuhrer and Moore, 1995; Galí and Gertler, 
1999; Mankiw, 2001). Backward-looking expectations must be incorporated into these 
models, at least partially (Galí and Gertler, 1999). In this sense, these conventional 
inflation models seem to have a serious drawback. 
 The law of motion for inflation under the MDC-based procedure shown in 
Section 4.3, however, does not require households to generate any expectations. The 
persistent property of inflation (i.e., the trend component) is naturally generated, as 
equation (17) indicates, with no need for expectations. This is a remarkable advantage of 
this inflation model over conventional inflation models. This advantage suggests that 
what drives inflation, particularly its trend component, is not expectations but the 
heterogeneous feelings of MDC between the government and households. In this case, 
expectations are essentially irrelevant to development of inflation, at least to that of trend 
inflation. 
 However, this does not mean that households behave in backward-looking 
manners under the MDC-based procedure. On the contrary, their sole objective is to 
achieve MDC in the future, regardless of their past behaviors. In some cases, as a result 
of reconsiderations, they may completely change their courses abruptly, or in others, the 
behaviors may be similar. In this sense, households and the government are behaving 
fully in forward-looking manners under the MDC-based procedure. 
 The RTP-based procedure (i.e., rational expectations) and the MDC-based 
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procedure are therefore common in that households behave in forward-looking manners, 
but there is an important difference between them. The RTP-based procedure requires 
households to know the objectively correct and true model and parameter values ex ante 
and to make no systematic errors in their expectations on average. That is, the objectively 
correct path to the destination exists and can be known, and households must follow this 
objectively correct path. Nevertheless, the location of destination (?̃?𝑅𝑇𝑃) is not initially 
known to households, but instead the value of RTP is initially given to them. Hence, they 
first must detect the unknown location of the destination correctly with the given value 
of RTP while simultaneously uncovering the objectively correct and true path to the 
destination.  
 On the other hand, the MDC-based procedure requires households only to move 
toward destinations that are known to them from the beginning, considering other 
economic agents’ behaviors, whatever those paths may be. Metaphorically speaking, 
households behave as if they are playing chess. The destination (objective) is always clear 
(i.e., win the game), although how they will do so is unknown before the game starts. 
Winning moves can be different in each game; that is, there are various routes to the 
destination in each case. Therefore, no objectively correct route to a destination exists, or 
at least, it cannot be known in advance. Even though the routes vary and are unknown ex 
ante, the location of the destination (𝛤(?̃?)) itself is clearly known to households from the 
beginning, and therefore they need not detect it first by themselves. What they should do 
is only to move toward the ab initio known destination regardless of route. 
 
5  MONETARY POLICIES 
 
5.1  Necessity of an independent central bank 
If ΓP < ΓG, inflation accelerates according to the law of motion for inflation shown in 
Section 4. To stop inflation acceleration, ΓG has to be sufficiently lowered so that ΓP > ΓG, 
but how can this be done?  
 𝛤𝑃  and 𝛤𝐺  should be considered as a kind of preference because it is not 
acquired after some amount of study or by calculating some “optimal” values. Rather, it 
is endowed intrinsically, and no household knows the reason why its own unique 𝛤𝑃 is 
set at a given point. Because 𝛤𝑃 and 𝛤𝐺 are a kind of preference, it is very difficult for 
a household or a government to control its 𝛤𝑃  or 𝛤𝐺  by itself. Both households and 
governments will want to behave based absolutely on their own intrinsic preferences, 
even if those preferences result in unfavorable consequences. Therefore, even though a 
government is fully rational and is not weak, foolish, or untruthful, it will still be unable 
to self-regulate its own preferences, including its ΓG.  
 Hence, the help of an independent neutral organization is needed to control or 
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change a government’s 𝛤𝐺. A common way to obtain this help is to delegate this authority 
to an independent central bank, which can set and maintain a target rate of inflation and 
manipulate interest rates as a way to control 𝛤𝐺 . The independent central bank can 
faithfully control 𝛤𝐺 because these actions are not related to the bank’s preferences, but 
rather they are simply its delegated duty.  
 
5.2  Monetary policies to lower inflation 
In this discussion, suppose that the central bank is fully independent and the government 
has no power to influence its behavior. In other words, the bank is completely independent.  
 
5.2.1  Central bank actions  
To lower inflation, the central bank must force the government to lower its 𝛤𝐺, but how? 
One way is for the central bank to absorb money (savings) from the private sector, for 
example, by selling government bonds in financial markets. As a result of this action, the 
amount of money (savings) in the private sector decreases until it becomes smaller than 
the amount needed for equation (1) to be satisfied at steady state. Because of the shortage 
of money (savings) in financial markets, Rt increases, and if πt is unchanged, 𝑅𝑡 − 𝜋𝑡 
also increases. That is, the increased rate of the government’s real obligation becomes 
higher than the level required for equation (1) to be satisfied at steady state such that   
 
𝑅𝑡 − 𝜋𝑡 = 𝛤𝐺 (
1 − 𝛼
𝛼
) + ψ > 𝛤𝐺 (
1 − 𝛼
𝛼
) (= 𝜃𝐺) ,                      (19) 
 
where ψ (> 0) is a variable controlled by the central bank and can be interpreted as the 
extra rate of increase of the government’s real obligation that the central bank imposed 
on the government. Clearly, in the situation where inequality (19) holds, the government 
cannot feel its MDC.  
 Because the central bank forces 𝑅𝑡 − 𝜋𝑡 = 𝛤𝐺 (
1−𝛼
𝛼
) + ψ  while households 
and firms still behave as if they are maintaining 𝑟 = 𝛤𝑃 (
1−𝛼
𝛼
),  
 
  𝛤𝐺 (
1 − 𝛼
𝛼
) + ψ + 𝜋𝑡 = ∫ ∫ 𝜋𝑣𝑑𝑣𝑑𝑠 + 𝛤𝑃 (
1 − 𝛼
𝛼
)
𝑠+1
𝑠
𝑡
𝑡−1
 
 
by equations (4), (6), and (13), which means  
 
∫ ∫ 𝜋𝑣𝑑𝑣𝑑𝑠
𝑠+1
𝑠
𝑡
𝑡−1
= 𝜋𝑡 + (
1 − 𝛼
𝛼
) (𝛤𝐺 − 𝛤𝑃) + ψ .                       (20) 
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By equations (3) and (13), equation (20) is equivalent to 
 
 ∫ ∫ 𝜋𝑣𝑑𝑣𝑑𝑠
𝑠+1
𝑠
𝑡
𝑡−1
= 𝜋𝑡 + 𝜃𝐺 − 𝜃𝑃 + ψ .  
 
By equation (20), inflation will continue to accelerate after the imposition of ψ if the 
government does not react to the central bank’s actions. 
 
5.2.2  Tug of war 
The forced situation 𝑅𝑡 − 𝜋𝑡 = 𝛤𝐺 (
1−𝛼
𝛼
) + ψ is intolerable for the government because 
it is not at MDC, and the situation is not sustainable. If the government were to follow 
the path indicated by inequality (19), it would have to increase taxes and/or decrease 
expenditures more than it could tolerate in the future, which could threaten the 
government’s existence. Knowing this consequence, the government will be strongly 
motivated to change the situation imposed on it by the central bank.  
 One way for the government to do so is to reduce its absorption of money 
(savings) from the private sector, which can be interpreted as lowering the government’s 
preference from 𝛤𝐺  to ?̌?𝐺  (?̌?𝐺 < 𝛤𝐺). Because of this reduction, Rt and 𝑅𝑡 − 𝜋𝑡  will 
also decrease. If the government reduces its absorption of money (savings) by a sufficient 
amount and the central bank ascertains that ?̌?𝐺 has become sufficiently low such that  
 
𝑅𝑡 − 𝜋𝑡 = ?̌?𝐺 (
1 − 𝛼
𝛼
) < 𝛤𝑃 (
1 − 𝛼
𝛼
) < 𝛤𝐺 (
1 − 𝛼
𝛼
)  ,                      (21) 
 
then the central bank will stop imposing ψ, that is, stop absorbing money (savings) from 
the private sector.  
 After the central bank eliminates ψ, the government may resume its attempt to 
raise 𝑅𝑡 − 𝜋𝑡  because, as inequality (21) indicates, ?̌?𝐺  does not correspond to the 
intrinsic 𝛤𝐺. However, the central bank continuously monitors the government, and if it 
perceives such an attempt, it will immediately re-impose ψ. This “tug of war” between 
the central bank and the government may be repeated for an extended period, but 
eventually the government will realize the determination of the central bank to keep this 
lower 𝑅𝑡 − 𝜋𝑡 and will no longer resist it (see Section 5.2.3). As a result, inflation will 
eventually begin to decelerate steadily according to equation (15) as the central bank 
planned.  
 Hence, if a fully independent central bank manipulates ψ as shown above, the 
acceleration of inflation will eventually stop and deceleration will start. However, a “tug 
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of war” period between the two may be unavoidable, and it will usually take some period 
of time for inflation to completely stabilize at the desired level. As the “disinflation” 
observed in the 1980s indicates, the process toward lower inflation can proceed quite 
slowly.  
 
5.2.3  “Tamed” government 
As some point, the government will be “tamed” by a truly independent central bank in 
the manner shown in Section 5.2.2. This tamed behavior means that the government’s 
intrinsic preference 𝛤𝐺 is forcibly changed by the central bank to ?̌?𝐺 so as to satisfy 
 
−
g
𝑡
− 𝑥𝑡 − 𝑠𝑡
𝑏𝑡
(
𝛼
1 − 𝛼
) = ?̌?𝐺≤ 𝛤𝑃<𝛤𝐺                                  (22) 
 
at steady state. Inequality (22) indicates that the government cannot borrow money 
(absorb savings) from the private sector as much as it intrinsically desires because the 
value of −
g𝑡−𝑥𝑡−𝑠𝑡
𝑏𝑡
 at steady state is forced to be lower than the value at which it 
intrinsically feels most comfortable.  
 
5.3  Monetary policies to reverse deflation 
Deflation means that the condition ΓP > ΓG has occurred at least temporarily. This 
situation is the opposite of the usual case (i.e., ΓP ≤ ΓG) and has only rarely been observed 
historically. Deflation can occur, however, so suppose that ΓP > ΓG, and ΓP is exogenously 
given and does not change. Suppose also that the central bank is fully independent as 
discussed in Section 5.2.  
 
5.3.1  Measures and consequences 
In the case of deflation, a fully independent central bank has to force the government to 
raise its 𝛤𝐺 such that ΓP < ΓG to reverse the situation from deflation to inflation. One way 
to so is for the central bank to inject money into the private sector, for example, by 
purchasing government bonds in financial markets. This action will reduce the amount of 
savings in the private sector so it will become less than the amount that corresponds to 
equation (1) at steady state. As a result, Rt decreases, and if πt is unchanged, 𝑅𝑡 − 𝜋𝑡 also 
decreases. That is, the rate of increase of the government’s real obligation decreases such 
that 
 
𝑅𝑡 − 𝜋𝑡 = 𝛤𝐺 (
1 − 𝛼
𝛼
) − ψ < 𝛤𝐺 (
1 − 𝛼
𝛼
) (= 𝜃𝐺) .                      (23) 
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In this situation, the government cannot feel its MDC. Note that, unlike in inequality (19), 
the sign of ψ (> 0) is negative in inequality (23). 
 The government can escape from this situation by increasing its absorption of 
money (savings) from the private sector. Because of the increase in absorption of money 
(savings), Rt and 𝑅𝑡 − 𝜋𝑡 will increase. However, as with the case of lowering inflation, 
a tug of war between the central bank and the government will begin, but eventually the 
government will succumb to the fully independent central bank. This means that the 
government’s preference ΓG is forced to increase from ΓG to ?̂?𝐺 (𝛤𝐺 < ?̂?𝐺) by the central 
bank. As a result, 𝛤𝐺 < 𝛤𝑃≤?̂?𝐺  will be realized, and the deflation will be eventually 
reversed to inflation according to equation (15) as the central bank planed. 
 
5.3.2  Lower bound and deflationary steady state 
The nominal interest rate, however, has a zero lower bound (i.e., 𝑅𝑡 ≥ 0 must always 
hold). Hence, ψ (> 0) is subject to  
 
𝑅𝑡 = 𝛤𝐺 (
1 − 𝛼
𝛼
) − ψ + 𝜋𝑡 ≥ 0 
 
and thereby  
 
 𝛤𝐺 (
1 − 𝛼
𝛼
) + 𝜋𝑡 ≥ ψ > 0 . 
 
Therefore, if πt is largely negative such that  
 
 𝜋𝑡 < −𝛤𝐺 (
1 − 𝛼
𝛼
)  ,  
 
the central bank cannot set ψ appropriately to reverse deflation because it cannot realize 
inequality 𝑅𝑡 < 0, even though this inequality needs to hold to reverse deflation. In this 
case, the central bank cannot reverse deflation and can only keep 𝑅𝑡 = 0. 
 If πt continues to be largely negative such that 𝑅𝑡 − 𝜋𝑡 > 𝑟 for 𝑅𝑡 = 0, the 
economy will collapse because equation (13) cannot be satisfied and thereby no steady 
state in the private sector exists except for corner solutions. Because they are well aware 
of this very negative consequence, households and firms will not persistently allow a 
largely negative πt. Therefore, it is likely that generally 
 
𝑅𝑡 − 𝜋𝑡 ≤ 𝑟 
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is kept for 𝑅𝑡 = 0. Particularly, for 𝑅𝑡 = 0, the state that satisfies 
 
𝜋𝑡 = −𝑟 = −𝛤𝑃 (
1 − 𝛼
𝛼
)   (= −𝜃𝑃)                                    (24) 
 
is a steady state with deflation (i.e., a deflationary steady state). If equation (24) is 
satisfied, a deflationary steady state can persist indefinitely.  
 
5.3.3  Difficulties 
It is highly likely that intrinsically ΓP ≤ ΓG, as discussed in Section 4, and the case where 
ΓP > ΓG occurs will be a very special case that will exist only temporarily, if at all. 
However, the experience of the Japanese economy since the 1990s suggests that it is 
possible that it is still difficult for a central bank to reverse deflation even after ΓP ≤ ΓG 
has returned. Harashima (2018b) has discussed a Pareto inefficient path as the best choice 
of households after a shock on RTP under the RTP-based procedure. In this case, the link 
between r and θP is severed (i.e., equation [13] cannot hold); therefore, inflation/deflation 
will float because equation (16) also does not hold anymore. Under the MDC-based 
procedure, it seems likely that the same phenomenon (i.e., the link between r and ΓP is 
severed) also occurs.  
 On the other hand, Harashima (2016b) has discussed the possibility after 
deflation that a “tamed” government (i.e., one that has experienced an 
inflationary/deflationary period) may fear the punishment that would be imposed on it by 
the central bank if inflation were to begin to re-accelerate. In an environment where ΓP < 
ΓG has returned after deflation, the central bank will resume forcing the government 
toward ΓP ≥ ΓG. If the government knows this, it may keep ΓP = ΓG during a period of 
deflation (i.e., maintain the deflationary steady state) to prevent the unwanted actions of 
the central bank due to the acceleration of inflation. Because of this “inhibitory effect,” a 
deflation may not be reversed, and the economy will stay at a deflationary steady state 
even after ΓP < ΓG has returned. 
 
6  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The inflation models based on NKPC and FTPL do not seem sufficiently compelling 
because both possess important problems. Harashima (2004, 2005, 2006, 2007a, 2007b, 
2007c, 2008, 2013a, 2013b, 2016a, 2018c) has presented an alternative inflation model 
in which a trend in inflation is naturally generated as a result of heterogeneity in 
preferences of households and the government, which all behave in forward-looking 
manners.  
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 This alternative inflation model is constructed in the framework of the rational 
expectations hypothesis, but this hypothesis has been criticized for imposing substantial 
demands on economic agents. Harashima (2018a, 2019) has presented the MDC-based 
procedure by which households reach a steady state as a substitute for the RTP-based 
procedure. With the MDC-based procedure, a household simply has to act on its feelings 
about whether the combination of its labor income and capital (wealth) is comfortable or 
not. The MDC-based procedure is thus far easier for households to use but leads to the 
same steady state.  
 In this paper, I modified Harashima’s (2004, 2018b) alternative inflation model 
to enable it to be used in an economy in which households and the government behave 
under the MDC-based procedure and showed that, if 𝛤𝑃  and 𝛤𝐺  are heterogeneous, 
inflation accelerates (or decelerates). The essential driving mechanism of inflation 
acceleration (deceleration) is that a government behaves to match the rate of increase of 
its real obligation with its 𝛤𝐺, but households and firms behave to match the real interest 
rate with 𝛤𝑃. The contradiction between the rate of increase of the government’s real 
obligation and the real interest rate (i.e., the discrepancy between 𝛤𝐺 and 𝛤𝐺) must be 
resolved by the acceleration (or deceleration) of inflation. The law of motion for inflation 
is identical under the MDC-based and RTP-based procedures, but the element of 
expectations need not be directly included in the law of motion for inflation under the 
MDC-based procedure, even though households and the government still behave fully in 
forward-looking manners under the MDC-based procedure. 
 To control inflation, a truly independent neutral central bank is needed because 
𝛤𝑃 and 𝛤𝐺 is a kind of preference, and both people and the government cannot easily 
control their own preferences. The central bank can, however, control 𝛤𝐺 by forcing the 
government to increase its real obligations and thereby control inflation.   
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